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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 49 SUMMER 1975 NUMBER 4
PROPERTY PLANNING AND THE SEARCH
FOR A COMPREHENSIVE HOUSING
POLICY-THE VIEW FROM MOUNT LAUREL
PATRICK J. RottAs*
It is generally conceded that the nation is suffering from a chronic
housing shortage and that the situation is worsening.' Land prices, as
well as the escalating cost of labor and material, are driving the initial
cost of home ownership and, correspondingly, of rental accommodations
beyond the reach of an ever greater percentage of the population.2
Simultaneously, the housing stock of our major cities is being depleted
via the ravages of time, owner neglect, and affirmative abuse on the
part of some occupants. What new housing is being built is to be found
on the periphery of the avalanche of development proceeding out in
concentric circles from major urban centers. Here, single-family units,
detached or otherwise, are the rule, and multifamily and rental accom-
modations are the exception. 3 The physical makeup of such new com-
munities, the necessity for commutation to centers of employment, and
* Professor of Law, St. John's University; B.A. 1954, LL.B. 1956, St. John's University;
LL.M., Harvard University, 1957; J.S.D., Columbia University, 1965.
1 See Mallach, Do Lawsuits Build Housing?: The Implications of Exclusionary Zoning
Litigation, 6 RUTGERS* CAMEN L.J. 653 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mallach]; Pearlman
& Benton, State Homeownership Programs, 3 BNA HOUSING & Day. REP. 199 (1975).
2 See S BNA HOUSING & DEv. REP. 195 (1975), wherein it is reported that the median
price of single-family units sold during April 1975 was $39,500, an increase of $3800 over
the median price for the previous year. Further, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
has stated that even the $2000 tax credit on the purchase of a new home has not effectively
spurred sales. Id. at 193. See also Rose, Exclusionary Zoning and Managed Growth: Some
Unresolved Issues, 6 RUTGERS a CArDEN L.J. 689, 694 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rose].
8 See 3 BNA HoUsING & DEv. REP. 195 (1975). Of the 1.126 million housing starts in
May 1975, 886,000 were single-family units, 53,000 were two-to-four-unit buildings, and
187,000 were buildings with five or more units. Further, of the 909,000 building permits
issued in the same month, 653,000 were for single-family units, 54,000 were for two-to-four-
unit buildings, and 202,000 were for buildings with five or more units. Finally, of the
1.173 million housing completions in April 1975, single-family units accounted for 724,000
completions, two-to-four-unit buildings accounted for 69,000 completions, and buildings
with five or more units accounted for the remaining 380,000 completions. Multifamily
housing starts, i.e., buildings with more than five units, had decreased 58% from May
1974, whereas single-family housing starts had decreased only 4.2%. Permits issued for
multifamily housing had decreased 50% from the previous year, but single-family unit
permits decreased only 5.3%. Id.
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the real property tax picture make it all but impossible for young mar-
ried couples and those living on fixed incomes to find suitable shelter
within these new suburbs. In the older suburbs that were developed
after World War II, the first generation of occupants is reaching the
stage in life when it no longer needs, and in many instances can no
longer afford, large detached homes, and yet, it can find no suitable
substitute. It would be safe to conclude that there is too little housing
available or under construction and that the shelter that is being built
is too expensive or otherwise unsuited to the needs of a large segment
of the population.4
This background explains why much will be written in praise of
the far-reaching opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.5 There the court took an ex-
pansive view of both the concept of "general welfare" and the objec-
tives of the zoning process.0 In so doing, it concluded that, when for-
mulating land use controls, municipalities must take into account the
amount and types of housing needed by the population of the region'
Accordingly, where local regulations frustrate development of needed
housing facilities, they will be struck down as unauthorized by the
police power and violative of the equal protection clause of the state
constitution. 8 Moreover, the justification that this evil was either un-
4 See notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra.
567 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3198 (U.S. Oct. 6,
1975) (No. 75-38).
6 Id. at 178-79, 336 A.2d at 727-28. The traditional view of the objectives of zoning
ordinances is noted in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 565 (1926). There,
the United States Supreme Court determined that a municipality has a right to control
and regulate the development of privately owned land for the benefit of the community.
Such authority, premised upon a delegation of the state's police power, will permit a
municipality to take reasonable action in furtherance of public safety, health, and general
welfare. See also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Kennedy Park Homes
Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
7 67 N.J. at 188-90, 336 A.2d at 732-34. This expansive view of the zoning process has
been advocated by some commentators to offset the inherently discriminatory features of
exclusionary zoning ordinances. See, e.g., Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 SrAN. L. RaV. 767 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Sager].
See also Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and
Dandridge, 81 YALE LJ. 61 (1971), wherein the author, summarizing the views of those
opposed to exclusionary zoning, states that
exclusionary zoning statutes must be measured by a compelling state interest
rather than a rationality standard because such statutes discriminate against two
classes entitled to special judicial protection, racial minorities and the poor, and
deny citizens their "fundamental interest" in housing. Opponents of exclusionary
zoning contend, in this connection, that the compelling state interest test applies
when the effect of a zoning statute is to discriminate against a racial minority or
the poor, although the legislators who passed the zoning law may not have had a
discriminatory motive or purpose.
Id. at 67 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
8 67 NJ. at 174-75, 336 A.2d at 725, quoting N.J. CONsr. art. I, 1. Notwithstanding
the recognized need for adequate housing, the United States Supreme Court, in Lindsey
[Vol. 49:653
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intended or merely the byproduct of a good faith attempt to keep real
estate taxes within bounds will not alter the result.9 In the pages that
follow, the strong and weak points of the Mount Laurel decision are
analyzed and some suggestions for the formulation of an affirmative
housing program are offered.
THE Mount Laurel CONTROVERSY
The Township of Mount Laurel is comprised of 22 square miles
of land (approximately 14,000 acres) located in southern New Jersey,
in close proximity to Philadelphia. As of 1950, the population of Mount
Laurel was 2817, and agriculture was the Township's principal land
use. Several pockets of poverty existed, with low income families living
in dilapidated housing. At the time of the Mount Laurel litigation,
only 300 of these substandard units remained. After 1950, with the
advent of improved highways, residential development and some com-
merce and industry arrived on the scene. By 1960, the population had
practically doubled, and by 1970, it swelled to 11,221.10 The new resi-
dents were drawn from outside the Township and were employed in
the surrounding region. The court described Mount Laurel as "now
definitely a part of the outer ring of the South Jersey metropolitan
area, which area we define as those portions of Camden, Burlington
and Gloucester Counties within a semicircle having a radius of 20 miles
or so from the heart of Camden city."" At the present time, approx-
imately 65 percent of the land in the Township is either devoted to
agriculture or otherwise undeveloped.
As originally enacted, the zoning ordinance in question contained
no provision for multifamily or attached housing. The municipality's
three residential zones called for single-family, detached houses built
on lots ranging in area from V4 to V. acre. 12 A later amendment created
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), refused to grant such need the status of a fundamental
interest protected by the equal protection dase of the United States Constitution. In
speaking for the majority, Justice White stated:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But
the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic
ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of
access to dwellings of a particular quality ....
Id. at 74.
0 67 N.J. at 188, 336 A.2d at 732.
101d. at 161, 336 A.2d at 718.
I' Id. at 162, 336 A.2d at 718.
12Previous cases holding minimum lot size ordinances unconstitutional typically
involved larger parcels. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128
N.J. Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (L. Div. 1974) (one- and two-acre zoning); In re Kit-Mar
Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) (two- and three-acre lots); In re Girsch,
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (two-acre zoning); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419
Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (four-acre lots).
19751
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a "cluster" zone,' wherein the minimum lot size could be reduced by
one-half, provided the developer dedicated from 15 to 25 percent of
his total acreage to public use. Even within the cluster zone, however,
single-family detached housing remained the only permissible use. The
combination of minimum frontage and building size requirements
worked to exclude low-cost housing. In 1971, the average dwelling in
the Township was priced at $32,500.14
Pursuant to enabling legislation enacted in 1967,1r Mount Laurel
adopted supplemental zoning provisions which authorized creation of
planned unit developments (PUD). While the PUD ordinance 0 did
permit multifamily housing, it was not designed to accommodate and
in fact was decidedly beyond the economic means of low and moderate
income families, particularly those with young children. In order to
control the occupancy in such developments, the PUD amendment se-
verely limited the number of multibedroom apartments and required
that leases limit the number of school-aged children, that developers
covenant to pay tuition costs in the event more than a fixed number
of children reside in the multifamily units, and that amenities, such as
central air conditioning, be furnished in order to push rent and sales
prices to high levels. Even though the Township's PUD ordinance was
subsequently repealed, it was considered by the court because of the
possibility of its reenactment and its part in the pattern of exclusionary
legislation.
Another relevant amendment to the ordinance created a Planned
Adult Retirement Community (PARC) zone17 which sanctioned multi-
family housing for adults over 52 years of age.' 8 The court found, how-
ever, that the numerous development requirements outlined in the
ordinance made it clear that the plan was not designed for, and would
be well beyond the financial means of, retirees with low and moderate
incomes. In fact, whenever substandard accommodations were vacated,
the Township moved to eliminate them by forbidding further occu-
pancy. All nongovernmental attempts to improve conditions were effec-
18 See 67 N.J. at 165, 336 A.2d at 720.
14 Id. at 164, 336 A.2d at 719.
15 See The Municipal Planned Unit Development Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55-54
et seq. (Supp. 1975). This legislation was designed to organize New Jersey's urban expansion
and to meet the demand for adequate housing facilities.
16 See 67 N.J. at 166-67, 336 A.2d at 721.
17 See id. at 168-69, 336 A.2d at 722.
18 This type of restriction has been declared unconstitutional in New Jersey. See
Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Township v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376,
311 A.2d 187 (App. Div. 1973); Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Plan. Bd., 128
NJ. Super. 379, 320 A.2d 191 (Ch. 1974).
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tively thwarted. In neither the original nor the amended ordinance
was any provision made for trailers or mobile homes, perhaps the most
economical form of housing in today's market. Finally, in order to
attract favorable "ratables"'1 and to freeze development of a large per-
centage of its land, the Township "overzoned" for industry. In excess
of 29 percent of the Township was so zoned, although only 2;/2 percent
of this land was actually used for industry and there was no anticipated
influx of potential plant site users.
The plaintiffs challenging the zoning ordinance fell into four dis-
tinct categories including present Township residents residing in sub-
standard housing, former residents displaced by the unavailability of
suitable housing within the Township, prospective low and moderate
income residents, and three organizations representing racial minorities.
For purposes of this litigation, the "low income" segment of the popu-
lation was defined as persons or families who, by virtue of their limited
income, were eligible for rent supplements or public housing units.
The "moderate income" group was defined as persons or families eli-
gible for occupancy in housing units receiving subsidies under the Na-
tional Housing Act or other similar federal housing programs.20 Having
concluded that the present residents had standing, the trial court found
it unnecessary to pass upon the status of the other plaintiffs.21 The New
Jersey Supreme Court, while expressing no opinion as to the standing
of the organizations, also recognized the right of former and prospec-
tive residents to be heard on the issues before the court.22
19 A "good ratable" is defined as a piece of real estate which yields to a governmental
subdivision a substantially high real estate tax revenue in relation to the expenditures
for services which must be provided for such property. See NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 171, 336 A.2d 713, 723 (1975).
20 National Housing Act, §§ 235, 236, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715Z, 1715Z-1 (Supp. HI, 1973).
The low and moderate income categories were defined in dollar terms in an earlier suit
involving different parties but similar issues in a lower court. In Oakwood at Madison,
Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 NJ. Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (L. Div. 1974), the court,
allowing its figures to vary according to family size, used "low income" to refer to those
persons earning less than $7000 a year and "moderate income" to those earning between
$7000 and $12,000 per year.
21 See NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 119 NJ. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (L.
Div. 1972). After the opinion in the Mount Laurel case was handed down by the New
Jersey Supreme Court, a parallel case reached the United States Supreme Court. In Warth
v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975), the Court found that all of the various types of plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue in the federal courts. Although a state's highest court may grant
standing to anyone it wishes within its own forum, it does not necessarily follow that
those same persons or groups will have standing in the federal courts.
22 On the issue of standing the court stated:
The township originally challenged plaintiffs' standing to bring this action. The
trial court properly held... that the resident plaintiffs had adequate standing to
ground the entire action and found it unnecessary to pass on that of the other
plaintiffs. The issue has not been raised on appeal. We merely add that both
1975]
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Faced with the unbroken pattern of exclusion of low and moderate
income families, coupled with the planned elimination of all existing
substandard housing facilities, the court unanimously concluded that
the zoning ordinance was invalid.2 While the majority found the de-
fects so grave as to be violative of the State's constitution,24 one of the
concurring justices was content to rest the result on the zoning enabling
statute and its underlying policy. 25 The entire court, however, was in
agreement as to the nature and extent of the defects in the ordinance.
The majority position is summarized in the following passage from the
opinion:
We conclude that every such municipality must, by its land use
regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appro-
priate variety and choice of housing. More specifically, presump-
tively it cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of people
mentioned for low and moderate income housing and in its regula-
tions must affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least to the ex-
tent of the municipality's fair share of the present and prospective
regional need therefor. These obligations must be met unless the
particular municipality can sustain the heavy burden of demon-
strating peculiar circumstances which dictate that it should not be
required so to do.20
The principal justification offered by the municipality was the
present and future economic well-being of its own inhabitants.2 More
categories of nonresident individuals likewise have standing .... No opinion is
expressed as to the standing of the organizations.
67 N.J. at 159 n.3, 336 A.2d at 717 n.3 (citations omitted).
23 Id. at 191, 336 A.2d at 734.
24 The court stated: "our opinion is that Mount Laurel's zoning ordinance is pre-
sumptively contrary to the general welfare and outside the intended scope of the zoning
power in the particulars mentioned." Id. at 185, 336 A.2d at 730.
25 Id. at 193, 336 A.2d at 735 (Mountain, J., concurring). Judge Pashman also wrote a
concurring opinion in which he stated:
I differ from the majority only in that I would have the Court go farther and
faster in its implementation of the principles announced today.... Mhe Court
[should] not restrict itself to the facts of this particular case but, rather, lay down
broad guidelines for judicial review of municipal zoning decisions which implicate
these abuses.
Id. at 194-95, 336 A.2d at 736 (citation omitted) (Pashman, J., concurring). Judge Pashman
then proceeded to outline such guidelines:
[he trial court ought to proceed in four steps:
(I) identify the relevant region;
(2) determine the present and future housing needs of the region;
(3) allocate these needs among the various municipalities in the region; and
(4) shape a suitable remedial order.
Id. at 215-16, 336 A.2d 747 (footnotes omitted).
26 Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724-25 (footnote omitted).
27 This line of reasoning is supported by cases holding that the general welfare prop-
erly promoted by an ordinance is that of the residents of the municipality which institutes
the ordinance. See generally Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Sager, supra note 7.
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specifically, the Township argued that by reason of New Jersey's tax
structure- one which finances municipal, governmental, and educa-
tional costs out of the revenue produced by local real property taxes -
every municipality should be free to allow only such uses as will have
a favorable impact upon the local tax picture. The State Legislature's
refusal to enact an income tax had forced local governments to rely
heavily upon property taxes to support education and municipal ser-
vices and has heretofore justified the scramble for good ratables,28 and
indirectly, the practice of exclusionary zoning. While not ruling out
the right of a municipality to seek good ratables, the court concluded
that economic considerations could not justify total exclusion of hous-
ing accommodations for low and middle income groups. Aesthetic and
environmental interests comprised the second justification offered by
the Township. Less restricted growth, it claimed, would prove too bur-
densome to its sewage disposal system and water supply,29 thus endan-
gering the health, safety, and welfare of the community. While recog-
nizing these concerns as legitimate, the court indicated that these goals
could be secured through alternative means, including builder exac-
tions or installations financed by way of special assessments.30
Central to the court's thinking was the notion that housing is an
essential of human existence and that the needs of the region's popu-
lation for various kinds of housing must be considered l by every mu-
nicipality, irrespective of the makeup of existing residents. In the words
of the court:
It is plain beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate
housing of all categories of people is certainly an absolute essential
in promotion of the general welfare required in all local land use
regulation. Further the universal and constant need for such hous-
ing is so important and of such broad public interest that the
general welfare which developing municipalities like Mount
Laurel must consider extends beyond their boundaries and cannot
be parochially confined to the claimed good of the particular
municipality. It has to follow that, broadly speaking, the presump-
tive obligation arises for each such municipality affirmatively to
plan and provide, by its land use regulations, the reasonable op-
portunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing, includ-
28 See note 19 supra.
29 See Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
SO Where a new housing development will increase the need for public services such
as sewerage, the municipality may require the builder to pay for the initial installation. Of
course, this cost is passed on to the initial purchaser.
31 But cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing quality not recognized as
fundamental interest).
1975]
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ing, of course, low and moderate cost housing, to meet the needs,
desires and resources of all categories of people who may desire to
live within its boundaries. Negatively, it may not adopt regu-
lations or policies which thwart or preclude that opportunity.3 2
The court stopped short of finding that local governments must actively
undertake a public housing program for the disadvantaged. It also
refrained from supervising the process of amending the Mount Laurel
ordinance to bring it in line with the court's opinion. Instead, it
ordered the Township to reform its zoning ordinance within 90 days,
relying upon the parties to advise the court - via renewed litigation -
as to any disobeyance of the order.33
THE AFTERMATH OF Mount Laurel
The opinion under discussion represents a significant step forward
in the housing field. As in the desegregation,3 4 reapportionment, 5 and
82 67 NJ. at 179-80, 336 A.2d at 727-28. The court amplified the "presumptive obliga-
tion" of the municipality in the following passage of its opinion:
We have spoken of this obligation of such municipalities as "presumptive." The
term has two aspects, procedural and substantive. Procedurally, we think the basic
importance of ajppropriate housing for all dictates that, when it is shown that a
developing municipality in its land use regulations has not made realistically
possible a variety and choice of housing, including adequate provision to afford
the opportunity for low and moderate income housing or has expressly prescribed
requirements or restrictions which preclude or substantially hinder it, a facial
showing of violation of substantive due process or equal protection under the
state constitution has been made out and the burden, and it is a heavy one, shifts
to the municipality to establish a valid basis for its action or non-action.... The
substantive aspect of "presumptive" relates to the specifics, on the one hand, of
what municipal land use regulation provisions, or the absence thereof, will evi-
dence invalidity and shift the burden of proof and, on the other hand, of what
bases and considerations will carry the municipality's burden and sustain what it
has done or failed to do. Both kinds of specifics may well vary between munid-
palities according to peculiar circumstances.
Id. at 180-81, 336 A.2d at 728 (citation omitted).
88 Id. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734. The court discussed, but did not definitively resolve,
the difficulty a municipality might have in ascertaining both regional housing needs
and its share of the regional burden. The court commented that:
Here we have already defined the region at present as "those portions of Camden,
Burlington and Gloucester Counties within a semicircle having a radius of 20
miles or so from the heart of Camden City." The concept of "fair share" is coming
into more general use and, through the expertise of the municipal planning ad-
viser, the county planning boards and the state planning agency, a reasonable
figure for Mount Laurel can be determined, which can then be translated to the
allocation of sufficient land therefore on the zoning map.... We may add that we
think that, in arriving at such a determination, the type of information and es-
timates, which the trial judge... directed the township to compile and furnish to
him, concerning the housing needs of persons of low and moderate income now
or formerly residing in the township in substandard dwellings and those presently
employed or reasonably expected to be employed therein, will be pertinent.
Id. at 190, 336 A.2d at 733 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). The court did note that
the needs of commuters from out-of-State would have to be considered. In a footnote, some
of the factors which might be taken into account in arriving at a "fair share" formula
were discussed. Id. at 215-16 n.17, 336 A.2d at 747 n.17 (Pashman, J., concurring).
84 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
85 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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public school funding areas, 30 the courts have taken the lead in directing
that necessary, albeit politically sensitive, steps be taken in the public
interest. State legislatures, composed as they are of individuals elected
on a local basis, have a built-in resistance to steps such as these that
override jealously guarded local values. Stated somewhat differently,
the jurist's constituency is the public at large, whereas that of the
legislator is his geographically circumscribed electorate. Accordingly,
decisions such as Mount Laurel accomplish what might otherwise take
decades to be realized through legislation.37 Nevertheless, it must be
recognized that the judicial system has its limitations in the housing
field. As the justices themselves stressed, courts cannot promulgate
zoning ordinances, and more precisely, they cannot manufacture hous-
ing to meet the obvious public need. It is also true that, in the last
analysis, courts must look to legislative guidelines in passing upon such
matters as minimum lot size, excessive building permit fees, time con-
trol zoning ordinances, builder exactions, and other emerging land
use controls.A8 Much needless and repetitive litigation -the cost of
which adds to the end product - could be avoided if the legislatures
ended their 50-year slumber and fashioned a comprehensive housing
policy. It would appear that a sound legislative housing program must
start with a clear picture of certain fundamental facts and objectives.
A basic list of these items would include the following:
(1) Quantity and cost. Housing is needed in large quantities and
must be manufactured at far less than prevailing market prices.89 Ac-
cordingly, the major thrust of any housing program should be the pro-
duction of the maximum amount of shelter at the lowest conceivable
cost. Any and all other objectives, whether legislatively or judicially
recognized, must be carefully scrutinized in order to determine the
extent to which they frustrate realization of this overall objective.
While it is customary to regard all construction expenses, builder
exactions for example, as part of the cost of doing business, all such
expenditures are immediately passed along to the ultimate purchaser
of the housing unit and should be evaluated in light of this fact.40
Moreover, excessive demands made upon the developer, whether in
terms of cash, land, or donated public facilities, may represent another
86 See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
(1973).
37 See notes 34-86 supra.
38 See Rose, note 2 supra, wherein the author states: "Perhaps the lesson of Mount
Laurel is that the courts alone cannot resolve these questions. Eventually there may
emerge a democratic consensus through which the legislature may provide more definitive
answers." Id. at 726.
89See notes 2-3 supra.
40 See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
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form of discrimination by the established residents against potential
newcomers.
There is a constant undercurrent of conflict, often left unarticu-
lated, between, on the one hand, the desire of the legislative and ju-
dicial branches to allow communities to regulate the sequence, type,
and cost of growth, and, on the other hand, the equally commendable
goal of fostering housing for all. Thus, it is conceivable that the highest
court of any given state could hand down a decision such as Golden v.
Planning Board1 sustaining time control zoning, and, on the same day,
hand down a decision like Mount Laurel. In rendering the two opin-
ions the court might not be aware of, nor deeply concerned with, the
fact that the two decisions point in different directions from an economic
point of view. One slows down the housing process and adds to the cost
of the end product; the other cuts redtape and mandates that munic-
ipalities do all that they can to facilitate, if not sponsor, housing for
the economically disadvantaged. Part of the problem, of course, lies in
the fact that we are accustomed to thinking in terms of the "haves"
and the "have-nots" as two mutually exclusive groups that encompass
the entire public to be served. When housing problems are viewed in
this way there is a tendency to overlook the housing difficulties of those
who are not on welfare but who still cannot afford decent shelter in
today's market.
(2) Society has a vital stake in how and where housing is built.
Once land is developed, its characteristics in a real sense are determined
for several generations to come. All too often, attention is focused upon
the position of the seller of raw land and that of the developer, with
little or no thought being given to the long term impact of the pro-
jected housing development upon its future inhabitants. In the post-
World War II era, this approach led to an unlimited expanse of "sub-
urban sprawl," with bedroom communities stretching out in all direc-
tions from centers of employment. The failure of local governments
to insist upon the creation of well-balanced communities has led directly
41 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.$.2d 138 (1972). Zoning ordinances were passed
by the Town of Ramapo to effectuate an 18-year master plan for development. According
to the plan, the granting of a permit for the development of a subdivision was predicated
upon the level of municipal services then available. A prospective developer, however,
could accelerate the subdivision approval process by agreeing to provide the municipal
services necessary to reach the required level. The goal was to create timed growth. The
New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. For a thorough
discussion of Golden, see Morris, "Zoning Imagination"-Dimensional Zoning, 46 ST.
Jonm's L. RE'. 679, 680 (1972); Note, Golden v. Planning Board: Time Phased Develop-
ment Control Through Zoning Standards, 38 ALBANY L. Rxv. 142 (1973); and Note, A
Zoning Program for Phased Growth: Ramapo Township's Time Controls on Residential
Development, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 723 (1972).
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to the social and economic waste inherent in having millions of persons
commute great distances each day to and from work and has accelerated
the search for good ratables. The pollution and energy price tag of this
mode of development is just coming to be recognized. In a similar vein,
with the advent of mammoth increases in utility rates, the much
publicized "all-electric home" has turned into a nightmare for home
buyers.4 This, in turn, has spotlighted the necessity for sound insula-
tion, just as the heightening concern for water purity has cast serious
doubt over the advisability of utilizing septic tanks in large-scale hous-
ing developments as a substitute for sewage and waste disposal systems. 43
Accordingly, it is becoming increasingly clear that society must have
an input in determining the location and composition of large-scale
developments.
(3) Affirmative steps must be taken to identify the types of housing
needed, to encourage its production, and to safeguard such housing
from local self-interest measures. As the Mount Laurel opinion makes
clear, housing needs must be approached on a regional basis.M However,
local goverments have neither the financial resources nor the expertise
- much less the inclination - to make the in-depth studies that a
regional approach requires. Accordingly, the underlying research must,
of necessity, be carried out at successively higher levels of government.
It must also be recognized that, however hospitable the climate of local'
opinion may be, low-cost and high density housing will not be built
if the same cannot be held or marketed at a respectable profit. There-
fore, serious thought should be given to the number and types of in-
centives that ought to be offered, including income and real estate
tax breaks, to attract private capital.45 If it becomes clear to developers
that entry into the low-cost and high density markets is financially
rewarding, society will have moved a long way towards reaching its
desired goal.
42 See N.Y. Times, June 9, 1974, § 1, at 43, col. I, wherein it is stated that people
unfortunate enough to own all-electric homes were paying approximately double their
normal electric bills due to Con Edison's fuel adjustment rate. One person was now
paying $295 a month for electricity. See also id., Mar. 8, 1974, at 12, col. 1.
43 The critical shortage of natural gas in certain parts of the country may lead to a
situation in which whole neighborhoods heated by gas are simply without fuel to burn.
The point to be noted is that even routine housing components may be affected by foreign
affairs and governmental priorities.
44 For a discussion of regional planning, see Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-
Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1957).
45 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(j)-(k) (1972) (guidelines on housing tax shelter under
the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.)). For an illustration of the type of incentive programs which could be
instituted, see Felix & McIntyre, Tax Shelters in FHA Housing Programs, 2 P-H TAX
IDEAS 27,501 (1972). See also 3 BNA HousING & Day. REP. 168 (1975).
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(4) Experimentation with various forms of building and land ar-
rangements must proceed apace. It is generally agreed that the tradi-
tional tract home will remain beyond the reach of the bottom 30
percent of the economic ladder for the indefinite future.4 Accordingly,
experimentation should be carried out with various forms of mass-
produced housing, including mobile homes47 and prefabricated struc-
tures, in order to reduce the initial cost of acquiring housing and the
subsequent costs of maintaining it. "Operation Breakthrough,"'48 spon-
sored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development some
years ago, represented a first step in the right direction. Cluster housing,
planned unit development, and similar land use measures should be
fostered in order to hold down land and construction costs. Significantly,
the court refused to pass on the validity of PUD ordinances in the
Mount Laurel opinion.
If the principles enunciated in Mount Laurel lead to greater use
of mass produced housing, the end result need not be a decline in
46 Steeping inflation is now pushing the cost of new homes up at a rate of more than
9% per year. Boston Sunday Herald, Sept. 7, 1975, § 3 (Real Estate-Classified), at 41, col. 3.
Figures prepared by the Mortgage Bankers Association of America reveal the effect inflation
has had on home prices:
First First (Percent)
Qtr. Qtr. Change
1970 1975 1970-1975
Median Price
New Homes Sold
(Average Jan., Feb., Mar.) $23,900 $36,500 52.7
Average Price New
Homes Sold
(Actually Sold) $27,00[sic] $40,600 50.4
(1967 "Standard" House) $28,600 $41,800 46.2
New Homes Sales
Price Index (1967 = 100) 116.4 170.1 46.1
Existing Home Sales
Price (Median) $22,600 $33,820 49.2
Department of Commerce
Composite Construction
Costs Index (1967 = 100)
(Average Jan., Feb., Mar.) 117.5 184.4 56.9
Rent Index (1967 = 100) 108.4 134.9 24.5
Danziger, Recreational Land Demand Expected to Strengthen, id. Aug. 31, 1975, § 4 (Real
Estate-Classified), at I, col. 1. See also Mallach, supra note 1, at 657 n.12, wherein the
author discusses the cost of undeveloped land in various New Jersey counties.
47 See Note, Toward an Equitable and Workable Program of Mobile Home Taxation,
71 YALE L.J. 702 (1962).
48 "Operation Breakthrough" was designed to provide mass production of low income
housing through the cooperative efforts of public officials, builders, and unions. According
to the plan, several prototypes were to be built, the most successful to be mass produced
and erected across the nation. N.Y. Times, May 9, 1969, at 1, col. 5.
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aesthetics, water pollution control, sanitary conditions, and the like.
The trailer park syndrome of the World War II era is not a necessary
corollary of more efficient production and delivery systems. Local gov-
ernments could still insist upon adequate standards of performance,
provided the standards are not a disguised method of excluding the
economically disadvantaged.
(5) An in-depth study of the residential construction industry
should be made. The housing industry, ranking closely behind agricul-
ture and automobile manufacturing, is a mainstay of the nation's
economy, especially when one considers its necessary tie-in with the
appliance and home furnishing industries. The fragile nature of the
industry is documented by the significant number of experienced de-
velopers that flounder each year. An offshoot of a study of the industry
might be renewed efforts to develop nationwide building code stan-
dards and to otherwise facilitate production and delivery of housing
components. The risks taken by prospective housing developers should
be quantified and made more, not less, predictable in order to foster
the production of housing. Thus, for example, a manageable insurance
program should be fashioned to back up express warranties on new
construction. Where local opposition needlessly delays a sound housing
project, all foreseeable items of damage, including the cost of carrying
the land, mortgage interest on the construction loan, and increased
construction costs due to inflation, should be recoverable by the devel-
oper. Another possibility would be the establishment of a summary
proceeding to determine such cases promptly. If a disgruntled property
owner wished to mount an appeal or to litigate matters that have al-
ready been litigated by others, full damages could be awarded the de-
veloper. Again, drawing a parallel to the criminal process, it might
prove advisable to vest exclusive authority to halt housing develop-
ments in one or more governmental agencies subject to appropriate
safeguards. Where local officials abuse legislative or administrative
machinery in an effort to delay or frustrate well-planned developments,
the courts should not permit such conduct to be shielded behind cliches
such as "nonreviewable legislative motive."49
(6) Different approaches should be formulated for municipalities
that are in various stages of the housing cycle. A well-balanced program
49 In one pending suit, damages are being sought against local officials for allegedly
acting improperly. The suit involves a $5.5 million claim brought in a federal district
court against present and former officials of Townsend, Massachusetts. The plaintiffs
allege that the defendants conspired to use their positions on various town boards to
prevent plaintiffs from obtaining the permits necessary to subdivide their land. See
Rohan & Berger, 3 CoNnoMmxum REP., Sept. 1975, at 8.
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should include aid to inner cities to prevent deterioration of their
housing stock, aid to local governments that are in immediate danger
of being overrun by developers, and aid to rural areas that seek to plan
for their orderly future development. The necessity for such a multi-
faceted approach was dearly outlined by the court in Mount Laurel.
(7) An in-depth study of rent control should be undertaken. Ren-
tal properties in urban centers are essential for low income families.
Until a suitable alternative form of shelter is provided by the operation
of free market forces (or by the government as the landlord of last
resort) some form of rent control is essential. It is becoming increasingly
clear, however, that existing rent control programs tend to destroy the
housing they are intended to stabilize. By the same token, blanket
prohibitions against conversion of apartments to cooperative or con-
dominium status frustrate another promising avenue of housing reform.
Both the rent control and the conversion process could be vastly im-
proved and made to work, especially if combined, where appropriate,
with government aid to low income families. The government's hous-
ing function has traditionally been viewed as an offshoot of the welfare
program and nothing more. The housing function should be regarded
as a separate and distinct obligation of society, especially if the bottom
30 percent of the economic ladder stand little or no chance of ever
earning sufficient income to afford acceptable housing.
(8) The structure and function of the real property tax must be
thoroughly reconsidered. Widespread dissatisfaction with the theory
and practice of real property tax assessment is becoming evident on a
nationwide basis. The function of this tax must be reassessed, particu-
larly in light of recent court rulings concerned with the role this form
of taxation plays in fostering unequal educational opportunities in the
public schools. 5° Again, it would be a futile gesture to make home own-
ership available to low and moderate income families who are then
unable to cope financially with an inordinate real estate levy. A soften-
ing of the real estate burden may ultimately be necessary, with the
lost revenue being made up by way of an increase in the graduated
income tax.
CONCLUSION
The Mount Laurel opinion raises many more problems than it
solves. There is the question of defining the applicable region, the
enigma of what to do with the small or fully established community,
50 See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 503 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
(1973).
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and the ultimate question of just what the municipality's affirmative
obligation is with respect to the creation of housing for the economically
disadvantaged. There is also the question of whether the lofty princi-
ples enunciated in the opinion lend themselves to application in con-
crete circumstances wherein the municipality's behavior pattern is not
as obvious as it was in Mount Laurel. Recognizing these problems, it is
still safe to conclude that the court opened a new era of judicial review
in land use matters by the very scope of its decision and the role played
by socio-economic factors in its rationale. Like United States Supreme
Court opinions in such areas as the "one-man-one-vote" principle, de-
segregation, and criminal procedure, the opinion may not prove easy of
application in any subsequent case. Nevertheless, it sets the tone for
what type of action is to be expected of local officials in land use matters
and provides the lower courts with the tools for reworking the entire
area. This, in the final analysis, may prove to be the lasting contribution
of the court that issued the Mount Laurel opinion.
